The (effective) Suslin-Kleene Theorem is obtained as a corollary of a standard proof of the classical Suslin Theorem, by noticing that it is mostly constructive and applying to it a naive realizability interpretation.
Kleene's Theorem (Kleene (1955a,b) ). Every ∆ 1 1 set A ⊆ N is hyperarithmetical.
This simple analysis, however, does not do justice to the classical theory, because it fails to take into account the "constructive bent" of the analysts who developed it: the standard proof of Suslin's Theorem in Kuratowski (1966) or Moschovakis (2009a) is, in fact, constructive, and if we apply to it the sort of realizability analysis pioneered by Kleene, which is well-understood today, it yields the Suslin-Kleene Theorem. From this point of view, the classical work is a refinement of the modern theory, since it yields the uniformities which refine the statements of the classical results, and it also provides constructive proofs that they do. This is the main point that I want to make in this article, and it basically amounts to an observation about the work of Stephen Cole Kleene: his deepest result in what we now call effective descriptive set theory is a direct corollary of classical work and his independently developed (and to the innocent eye unrelated) work in the foundations of intuitionism. Kleene's main technical tool is his Second Recursion Theorem, which he applies in both legs of his work: one might say that the observation we will make here simply reduces these crucial applications of the Recursion Theorem from two to one.
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I have included in the last section a discussion of the generality of the method in the article and whether it justifies the title.
Since there are very few researchers who are familiar with both descriptive set theory and intuitionism and I would like to make these ideas accessible more broadly, I am including below precise definitions of all the notions I need, as well as (condensed) outlines of the required arguments.
Recursion in Baire space
We summarize here the basic facts about recursive partial functions 2 with variables ranging over N or N = (N → N) and values in N or N . To simplify notation, we reserve the Latin letters e, m, s, t, u, v, w (perhaps with subscripts) for variables over N; the Greek letters α, β, γ, δ for variables over N ; and x, y, z for variables over points, i.e., members of product spaces as in (1) . By definition (X 1 × · · · × X n ) × (Y 1 × · · · × Y m ) = X 1 × · · · × X n × Y 1 × · · · × Y m , and if x = (x 1 , . . . , x n ), y = (y 1 , . . . , y m ), then (x, y) = x ⋆ y = (x 1 , . . . , x n , y 1 , . . . , y m ).
Subsets of these product spaces are called pointsets.
1 Cf. the companion articles Moschovakis (2009b Moschovakis ( , 2010 . 2 A partial function f : X ⇀ Y is a (total) function f : D f → Y defined on some subset D f ⊆ X , its domain of convergence, and for x ∈ X , we write f (x) ↓ ⇐⇒ x ∈ D f . Partial functions compose strictly, so that f (g 1 (x), . . . , g m (x))↓ =⇒ g 1 (x)↓ , . . . , g m (x)↓ .
We assume all the elementary facts and standard notations from elementary recursion (computability) theory on N.
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To allow some of the arguments of relations and partial functions to vary over N , we set α(t) = α(0), . . . , α(t − 1) , s(t) = s, and for x = (x 1 , . . . , x n ), we put x(t) = (x 1 (t), . . . , x n (t)) ∈ N n .
Definition. Fix some δ 0 ∈ N . A relation P ⊆ X = X 1 × · · · × X n is semirecursive in δ 0 , if there is a recursive relation R ⊆ N n+1 such that P (x) ⇐⇒ (∃t)R(δ 0 (t), x(t)) (x ∈ X ); a partial function f : X ⇀ N is recursive in δ 0 if its graph Graph f (x, w) ⇐⇒ f (x) = w is semirecursive in δ 0 ; a partial function f : X ⇀ N is recursive in δ 0 , if
with some f * : X × N ⇀ N which is recursive in δ 0 , so that, in particular,
and f : X ⇀ N or f : X ⇀ N is continuous if it is recursive in some δ 0 .
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We naturally skip the relativizing "in δ 0 " clause if δ 0 is recursive.
The basic properties of these relations and partial functions on product spaces are quite easily deduced from the properties of the corresponding numbertheoretic notions. We list some of them, skipping the relativized versions for simplicity:
(1) The class of semirecursive relations is closed under (total) recursive substitutions and the operations & , ∨, (∀t < s), (∃t), (∃α). (2) The class of recursive partial functions with values in N is closed under substitution of recursive partial functions with values in N and substitution of recursive total functions with values in N .
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3 In particular, x is the code of the sequence x = (x 0 , . . . , x n−1 ) ∈ AE n , so that the empty sequence has code 1 and for suitable recursive relations and functions, x = f n (x 0 , . . . , x n−1 ), Seq(w) ⇐⇒ w is a sequence code, lh( x ) = n, ( g(α) = 1, h(e) = λtµyT 1 (e, t, y), and f (e) = g(h(e)), then the relation f (e) ↓ ⇐⇒ (∀t)(∃y)T 1 (e, t, y) is not semirecursive, and so f : AE ⇀ AE is not recursive.
(3) The class of recursive partial functions with values in N is closed under substitutions of recursive partial functions of both kinds. (4) If f : X ⇀ N is recursive and f (x) = β, then β is recursive in x.
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Following (mostly) standard notation, we set
the shift α * and these coding and decoding functions for tuples in N are clearly recursive.
Next comes the basic representation result for these partial functions which follows quite easily from the corresponding fact about recursion on N:
Theorem 1 (Normal Form and Parametrization). There is a recursive function U : N → N and for each product space X = X 1 × · · · × X n , a recursive relation T X ⊆ N n+2 , so that the following hold, with
(1) A partial function f : X ⇀ N is recursive in δ 0 if and only if there exists some ε, recursive in δ 0 and such that
and f : X ⇀ N is recursive in δ 0 if and only if there exists some ε, recursive in δ 0 and such that f (x) = {ε}(x) (x ∈ X ).
(2) For every product space
We have favored the partial functions into N by skipping the superscript in the notation because these are the main objects that we will be using, as in the next, crucial result:
Theorem 2 (Kleene's Second Recursion Theorem). For each recursive partial f : N × X ⇀ N , there is a recursive ε ∈ N such that
Proof. The composition f (S(α, α), x) is recursive, and so there is a recursive ε 0 such that
so with ε = S(ε 0 , ε 0 ), we have
6 We say that β is recursive in x = (n 1 , . . . , n k , α 1 , . . . , α m ), if β is recursive in α 1 , . . . , α m .
The category of (inhabited) Baire-coded sets
A Baire-coded (or just coded ) set is a pair (A, c A ) of a set A and a surjection (the coding map) c A : |A| → → A of a set of codes |A| ⊆ N onto A, such that |A| has at least one recursive member. We think of any α ∈ |A| such that c A (α) = a ∈ A as a name of a, and we will generally refer to a "coded set A" and write
when the coding map c A is clear from the context or has already been specified. Consider the following examples of coded sets and "coded versions" of some familiar operations of set theory on them:
(CS1) We view N and N as coded sets, taking
(CS2) Products. The product A × B of two coded sets is coded by
and similarly for n-fold products; so every product space X is coded.
(CS3) Subsets. Every non-empty subset B ⊆ A of a coded set A is naturally coded by
(CS4) Continuous and recursive operations on coded sets. A map f : A → B on one coded set to another is continuous, if there is a continuous, partial f * : N ⇀ N which computes f , i.e., such that the following diagram commutes:
stating pedantically the convergence conditions, this means that for all α ∈ N ,
If (3) holds with a recursive f * , we say that f : A → B is recursive; and if f * = {ε} : N ⇀ N , we call ε a code of f , so that the sets (A → c B), (A → r B) of all continuous and recursive maps on A to B are also naturally coded. 7 We write
7 It is natural to think of the class of all Baire-coded sets as a category, with either the continuous or the recursive maps as morphisms. This certainly motivates some of the subsequent definitions, but we will not use it here in any significant way. (See also Footnote 10.)
An interesting special case is (N → c B), which comprises all sequences from B.
(CS5) Strings, continuous (clopen) subsets and trees. The set A <ω of all finite sequences from a coded set A is coded by
where β = c A (β). The length function lh : A <ω → r N, the imbedding a → (a) of A into A <ω , and the restriction (u, j) → u↾j and concatenation (u, v) → u⋆v maps are all recursive operations. For the initial segment relation, we write
A subset X ⊆ A is continuous (clopen) or recursive if its characteristic function is continuous or recursive, and the continuous and recursive powersets P c (A), P r (A) are coded as subsets of the corresponding coded function spaces (A → c N) and (A → r N):
Note that all subsets of N, N k and N <ω are continuous.
A tree on A is any set T ⊆ A <ω of finite sequences from A closed under initial segments, i.e., such that u ⊑ v ∈ T =⇒ u ∈ T . For any u ∈ A <ω , we let
so that T u is also a tree (albeit the empty tree if u / ∈ T ) and T ∅ = T . The body of a tree T on A is the set of all infinite paths in T ,
where f ↾n = (f (0), . . . , f (n − 1)). The projection of a tree T on A × A is
). The set T c (A) of all continuous trees is naturally coded as a subset of P c (A). We will be especially interested in trees on N (or N k for some k), and they are all continuous.
Next we introduce the natural coded versions of the most basic pointclasses of Descriptive Set Theory. Proof. The precise meaning of this for the case (for example) of (∃t) is that for each X , there is a recursive map
1 , x ∈ X ). To prove this, we choose a recursive ε 0 such that
and check that the function f
The same sort of familiar argument proves all the claims in the lemma.
If (4) holds, we can think of ε as also coding the complement of G and so get codings for the classes Π 0 1 ↾X , Π 0 1 ↾X of closed and co-semirecursive subsets of X ; and then, inductively, we can code the classical finite Borel and projective pointclasses for the product spaces we have been considering, as well as their effective subclasses. We do this explicitly only for the analytic and coanalytic sets with which we are especially concerned.
(CS7) Analytic and coanalytic sets. A set A ⊆ X is analytic if it is the projection of a closed set F ⊆ X × N , i.e.,
By the coding of closed sets above, this means that there is an ε ∈ N such that
and so we can code the family Σ 1 1 ↾X of analytic subsets of X taking N as the set of codes and
as the coding map. The class Π 1 1 ↾ X of coanalytic (complements of analytic) subsets of X is naturally coded with code set N again and coding map
and the class ∆ 1 1 ↾X of subsets of X which are both analytic and coanalytic is coded by ε → P
1 ↾X comprise the analytic, coanalytic and ∆ 1 1 subsets of X which have recursive codes. Finally, we give the coding for the Borel sets, which is the most complex one that we need.
(CS8) Borel sets. The class B ↾ X of Borel (measurable) subsets of X is the smallest class of subsets of X which contains all the open sets and is closed under complementation and countable unions.
To code B ↾ X , we first define by recursion on the countable ordinals the following subsets of N :
Next we define, by recursion again, for each ξ, a mapping c
where
and we let
It is easy to show (by induction on ξ) that
so that c X = ξ c X ξ defines a function on BC = ξ BC ξ ; and then, similarly, that each c X (α) is a Borel subset of X and every Borel set is c X (α) for some α ∈ BC, so that c X is a coding of B↾X .
Lemma 4. The operations of complementation
Proof. For complementation, choose a recursive ε 0 such that {ε 0 }(α, t) = α, and let u(α) = (1) * S(ε 0 , α), defined so that u(α)(0) = 1 and for all t, {u(α)
This is a recursive function and it computes the complementation operation on B, since for α ∈ BC,
The rest follows by applying the De Morgan rules and the idempotence of the complementation operation, (A c ) c = A.
Effective truth and realizability on S
Suppose (A, c A ), (B, c B ) are fixed coded sets and P ⊆ A × B. The ∀-∃ proposition 10 ϕ ≡ (∀x ∈ A)(∃y ∈ B)P (x, y)
is effectively (or uniformly) true (for the given codings) if there is a recursive partial function u : N ⇀ N such that for all α,
Our aim in the section is to show that constructive ∀-∃ consequences of effectively true ∀-∃ propositions are also effectively true-in fact something a little stronger than this; and then the Suslin-Kleene Theorem will follow directly from a constructive proof of this kind of the Suslin Theorem, which is expressed by the ∀-∃ proposition
The proof is given by formalizing constructive reasoning about coded sets and then applying a very simple realizability interpretation on this intuitionistic theory. It uses very well understood ideas and techniques-so we will be brief and we will skip the formal details. We will, however, be quite precise in the formulation of definitions and results.
The language L. We fix a family S of coded sets which includes all the coded sets we care about, and a set M which includes all the members of every A ∈ S. The idea is to view each A as a type (or sort) of member of M and to introduce a rich, typed first order language L on this set of types.
The terms of type A comprise a sequence v 0 , v 1 , . . . of variables of type A, and a constant c for each recursive member c of A, i.e., each c = c A (α) with a recursive α ∈ |A|. (So formally, we should write v A i and c A .) The formulas of L are defined by the following recursion, where P is any n-ary relation over M, viewed as a constant naming itself and (A, c A ) is any N -coded set with A ⊆ M:
It is important here that the relation symbols are not typed, e.g., s = t is well formed even when s and t are of different type.
10 It is natural (and useful) to think of the class of all coded sets as a category, with an arrow A u − → B signifying that the proposition (∀x ∈ A)(∃y ∈ B)[x = y] is effectively true via u.
The symbols for identity and membership are superfluous since we have allowed names for all relations on M, but their explicit mention here suggests how we intend to use the language. We will also use heavily the continuous application relations Ap
We will "abbreviate and misspell" these formal expressions, as usual, skipping (or adding) parentheses, writing (∃x ∈ A)ϕ, (∀x ∈ A)ϕ for the last two clauses, and identifying a recursive element c ∈ A with its formal name c A , letting the context determine A. We also set
letting again the context determine the specific A, B in the second of these.
Classical semantics. The satisfaction relation π |= χ between an assignment to the variables and a formula is defined by the usual recursive clauses and disregards the codings, for example:
Realizability. The C-realization relation ε, π cr χ between ε ∈ N , an assignment π and a formula χ is defined by the following recursive clauses:
[{ε}(α)↓ and {ε}(α), π{x := (c A (α))} cr ϕ.
We skip the π in the notation when χ is a sentence and (as usual) π is irrelevant.
A sentence is C-realizable if some ε C-realizes it,
and recursively C-realizable if it is C-realized by a recursive ε, rcr χ ⇐⇒ for some recursive ε ∈ N , ε cr χ.
11 Assignments respect types and are assumed extended to give the correct values to the constants. The update π{v := a} changes π only at v, to which it assigns a.
A formula χ is C-realizable if its universal closure is C-realizable, and similarly for recursive C-realizability.
Note. We have allowed (almost) arbitrary codings for the sets in S, as well as names in L for all (typed) recursive points and all relations on M, and we have identified realizability with satisfaction on the prime formulas. These nonconstructive features-and the fact that we argue classically about it-make C-realizability a useful tool for dealing effectively (if not always constructively) with complex families of sets, but they also make it quite unusual as a realizability notion.
12 Still, the general form of the definition is sufficiently close to Kleene's original "number realizability" to make the next result routine, once we fix a formulation of intuitionistic logic which is appropriate for L:
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Theorem 5 (Kleene). If a formula χ is a formal consequence in intuitionistic predicate calculus of recursively C-realizable sentences χ 1 , . . . , χ n , then χ is also recursively C-realizable.
Realizability, truth and effective truth. Directly from the definition, a ∀-∃ sentence is recursively C-realizable exactly when it is effectively true. On the other hand, not all realizable sentences are true: for example
is true but not realizable, and hence its (false) negation is realizable. This is a well-understood feature of all realizability interpretations which gets in the way of using realizability methods to derive classical results. We can bypass it, up to a point, by utilizing the richness of L to express classically interesting propositions by "essentially" ∀-∃ sentences, using the next proposition.
A formula ϕ(x 1 , . . . , x n ) with (no more than) the indicated free variables ranging over A 1 , . . . , A n is robust if the following two conditions hold: (R1) If ε, π cr ϕ(x 1 , . . . , x n ), then π |= ϕ(x 1 , . . . , x n ). (R2) If π |= ϕ(x 1 , . . . , x n ) and for each i, α i ∈ |A i | and α i = π(x i ), then there is some ε recursive in α 1 , . . . , α n such that ε, π cr ϕ(x 1 , . . . , x n ).
12 I thank Peter Aczel for pointing me to the "Kleene realizability" in Definition 8.4 of Rathjen (2005) which shares many important features with the present notion, including having code sets (types) for each set on which the realizers operate and (basically) the exact, same inductive clauses for the propositional and the bounded quantification constructs. The main differences are that Rathjen's types are defined "internally", within his constructive set theory, and so he can refer to and operate on them-which we cannot do in L; and (more significantly) that for membership x ∈ y and identity x = y, Rathjen's realization relationship is defined inductively, as in a classical forcing model, so that we cannot simply "import classical facts" about sets, as we can do in L, in which realizability coincides with (classical) truth on prime formulas. It is very difficult to compare the two notions, but it would (obviously) be very interesting if Rathjen can derive the Suslin-Kleene Theorem using his more constructive notion.
13 The technical assumption that each code set |A| has a recursive member is needed here to make (∃x ∈ A)[x = x] recursively realizable.
Proposition 6. (1) Every prime formula is robust.
(2) The class of robust formulas is closed under the propositional operations.
(3) Suppose ϕ( z, y) is robust, f : A → r B, and let
where f is a constant naming itself; then ϕ( z, f (x)) is also robust. In particular, if f, g are recursive operations, then the formula f (x) = g(y) is robust.
Proof (classical). (1) is trivial and (2) follows by an easy induction on formulas.
To prove (R2) for (3), assume for simplicity that y is the only free variable in ϕ(y) and suppose that π |= (∃y ∈ B)[Ap(f, x, y) & ϕ(y)], so that for some b ∈ B, π{y := b} |= Ap(f, x, y) & ϕ(y).
If a = π(x), this means that f (a) = b; and if f * : N ⇀ N is recursive and computes f and a = α for any α ∈ |A|, then β = f * (α) is a code of b which is recursive in α. By the robustness of ϕ(y), there is some ε recursive in β (and hence recursive in α) such that ε, π{y := b} cr ϕ(y); and then, directly from the definitions, for any γ,
so we get a recursive realizer by plugging any recursive γ in the expression on the left. The last claim follows by applying (3) twice to the prime formula u = v.
To see how we will use this Proposition in the next section, consider the following:
Corollary 7. If A, B are coded families of subsets of a space X and they are both recursively closed under countable unions, then the proposition
is a countable sequence of sets in A and each
is recursively C-realizable.
Proof. The displayed proposition is formalized in L by
where ∪ A : (N → A) → A is the assumed, recursive countable union operation on A. To compute a realizer for it, suppose we are given a code of some sequence f : N → c A and a realizer of (∀i ∈ N)(∃B ∈ B)[f (i) = B]; we can compute from these a code of some g : N → B such that for each i, g(i) = f (i); and then ∪ B (g) is a code of the set C ∈ B which is needed to realize the conclusion of χ, with ∪ B : (N → c B) → B the given, recursive countable union operation on B.
Notice that the argument would not work for χ ′ obtained from χ by the replacement
which is not (in general) realizable, even when true for the given values of C and f . Next we consider some sentences which express natural and useful propositions and determine whether they are (recursively) C-realizable.
The Continuous Axiom of Choice is the scheme
and it is not in general C-realizable, even with prime formulas ϕ. For example, the sentence "every Σ 1 1 subset of N is the projection of a tree on N 2 " is effectively true since from a Σ 1 1 -code of A we can easily compute a code of a tree T on N 2 which projects onto A; so
On the other hand, there is no f :
because this implies
with a continuous f * in the notation of (CS7), which is impossible, since the relation on the left is complete Π 1 2 while that on the right is Π 0 1 . This is not the simplest counterexample to the Continuous Axiom of Choice, but it is interesting here because (13) is relevant to our project. 14 A coded set A is extensional if there is a recursive g : A → r N such that for every a ∈ A, c A (g(a)) = a. The class of extensional coded sets contains N and N and it is closed under products and the operations A → A <ω , T c (A).
Theorem 8 (The Extensional Continuous Axiom of Choice).
15 If A is extensional, then for every B and every formula ϕ(x, y),
14 If we code the set R of real numbers in any natural way, then the Archimedean Principle (∀x ∈ R)(∃n ∈ AE)[x < ι(n)] (with ι : AE → R the natural imbedding) is effectively true; but every function f : R → c AE which is continuous in the present sense is also continuous relative to the usual topology of R, and hence constant, so that (∃f : R → c AE)(∀x ∈ R)[x < ι(f (x))] is not C-realizable. 15 The converse of this result is also true: if
and {ĝ}(α) = α, α , then (easily) g * (α) = {({ε}(ĝ)) 0 }(α) has the required property.
16 With A = AE, this is the Countable Axiom of Choice, and with A = N , it expresses various choice-versions of the so-called Continuity Principle.
Proof. Suppose (for simplicity) that ϕ(x, y) has no free variables other than x, y, and let g * : N ⇀ N compute some g : A → r N which witnesses the extensionality of A, so that
If β C-realizes the hypothesis of (AC c ), then for each α ∈ |A|, if a = c A (α) and b = c B (({β}(α)) 0 ), then ({β}(α)) 1 cr ϕ(a, b); and so also,
but by the given property of g * now,
This means that the map α → ({β}(g * (α)) 0 computes a function f : A → B with the required property, and that any ε which satisfies
It is easy to get a recursive such ε using (2) of Theorem 1.
The Extensional Continuous Axiom of Choice is not generally true, and so it is worth putting down the axioms of Countable and Dependent Choices which are; the first of these is a corollary of Theorem 8, and the second is easy.
Theorem 9 (AC N , DC). For every coded set A and every ϕ(n, x),
The next result is also easy and we will skip the proof, but it is important:
Theorem 10 (Markov's Principle). For every formula ϕ(n),
Finally we verify the recursive C-realizability of a very general principle of proof by induction on a wellfounded relation, which is the main tool that we will use in the next section:
Theorem 11 (Proof by wellfounded induction). For each wellfounded relation ≺ ⊆ A × A and each formula ϕ(x),
Proof. Assume again that (∀x ∈ A)ϕ(x) is a sentence. Using the convention (2) to simplify notation, we need to define a recursive ε ∈ N such that for every γ,
Fix some γ which satisfies the hypothesis of (16). We will prove its conclusion by induction on α, for an ε that we will define at the end of the argument (by appealing to the Second Recursion Theorem 2) when we will need it to justify the last step of the argument.
By the induction hypothesis, if β ≺ α, then, for any δ,
and so iff 0 is any (recursive) code of f 0 and
It follows that iff 1 is a recursive code of f 1 then
and so by the hypothesis on γ,
So far we have not used any properties of ε, except for the induction hypothesis. Now fix a (recursive) codef 3 of f 3 and choose ε by the Second Recursion Theorem so that it is recursive and
, which is what we needed to show.
The proof did not depend on any assumptions on the relation ≺ other than that it is wellfounded, and so its constructiveness (and consequently the constructive truth of (15)) may be in dispute.
17 In any case, what we need is an "internal" version of this result which justifies proof by backward (bar) induction on a tree with no infinite paths, as follows:
Theorem 12 (Proof by bar induction). For each formula ϕ(u),
where n varies over N and (∀u ∈ T )ψ :
Proof. The idea is that if the hypothesis of the implication to be proved is Crealizable for a given (value of the variable) T , then there are no infinite paths through T and so the relation
is wellfounded-which then allows us to construct a γ ′ that C-realizes the conclusion by a notational variant of the proof of Theorem 11. r be the intuitionistic theory with all true, recursively C-realizable sentences as axioms. A proof of a sentence χ in T r guarantees that χ is true, but also recursively C-realizable by the basic Theorem 5. It is often much easier to construct than a direct, messy definition of some ε which C-realizes χ-especially as we can often give informal constructive proofs skipping the (well understood) process of their formalization.
Proofs in T r are a bit hard to explain, because they include "subroutines" where we need to show, perhaps classically, that certain key propositions are recursively realizable. We will try to mark clearly the points when we switch between these two, different kinds of argument. In any case, we can appeal to all the numbered theorems in the preceding section except for 8, the Extensional Axiom of Continuous Choice, as well as to Proposition 6, which is an important tool.
Let us first prove in T r the "easy part" of Suslin's Theorem.
Theorem (in T r ) 13. Every Borel subset of a product space X is ∆ 1 1 . Proof. With the notation of (CS8), let for A, B ∈ B↾X :
The inference from ¬(∃f : AE → A)(∀n)[f n ∈ T ] to "we can prove propositions by induction along ≺ " is not obviously valid constructively. Some intuitionists accept it if T is a tree on AE and we replace ¬(∃f )(∀n)[f n ∈ T ] by (∀f : AE → A)(∃n)[f n /
∈ T ], which is how we will apply this result. The question is moot in the presence of Markov's Principle which implies the equivalence of these two properties of T when T ∈ T (AE), and which we can use, since it is recursively C-realizable. In any case, we only claim a classical proof of Theorem 12.
and verify (outside T r ) that this is a wellfounded relation on the Borel subsets of X . So Theorem 11 applies, and it is enough to prove (in T r ) that
The key observation is that For the converse, more difficult direction of Suslin's Theorem, it is convenient to deal only with subsets of N , from which the general result can be easily derived by standard methods. We show first the following, stronger result:
subsets of N , then there exists a Borel set C ⊆ N which separates A from B, i.e.,
Proof. 20 It is perhaps simplest to treat the separation relation as a primitive, Sep(A, B, C) ⇐⇒ C separates A from B, so we do not need to go into its definition in the constructive part of the proof, but notice that
With this understanding, the key is the following simple Lemma. If for all i, j ∈ N, A i , B j are Σ 1 1 subsets of N and C i,j is a Borel set which separates A i from B j , then i j C i,j separates i A i from j B j .
It is quite easy and we will skip its proof. 
There is no infinite branch through J:
, so that f ∈ A ∩ B, contradicting the hypothesis. So we can prove propositions by bar induction on J.
and, in the notation of (CS5), set
and check (easily) that
The proposition that we will prove by bar induction is (∀u ∈ J)[there exists a Borel set C u which separates A u from B u ].
In view of the Lemma, it is then enough to show that if u ∈ J, then for each tuple (t, ξ, s, η), there is a Borel set D which separates
]; if we can do this, then the Countable Axiom of Choice will give us a function
, and then the set
will separate A u from B u as required.
To show the claim in italics, given (t, ξ, s, η):
4) If s = t and τ (u)⋆(t, ξ) ∈ T and σ(v)⋆(s, η) ∈ S, then u⋆(t, ξ, η) ∈ J, and the induction hypothesis guarantees the existence of some D with the required property.
is recursively C-realizable, because of the coding of ∆ 1 1 ↾N . By the Separation Theorem, there is a Borel set C such that A ⊆ C and C ∩ (N \ A) = ∅, and so the proof will be complete if we can show
The (classical) proof of this is direct.
Comments and questions
Briefly, what we have done is to (1) introduce a formal language L in which many of the propositions of classical Descriptive Set Theory can be naturally expressed;
(2) define a realizability interpretation for L which is respected by intuitionistic deductive reasoning; and (3) derive the (effective) Suslin-Kleene Theorem by verifying that the (classical) Suslin Theorem can be proved intuitionistically from true, recursively C-realizable hypotheses.
It has been argued, moreover, that the same method can be used to prove the effective (uniform) versions of many classical results of descriptive set theory.
Is this a useful technical tool? The answer is clearly negative for those who are not already familiar with intuitionistic logic-there is just too much overhead. For those who know enough of it, however, so that they can recognize whether an informal argument can be formalized in intuitionistic logic, it can, indeed, be a powerful tool. At least for discovering results-which can then be proved by effective transfinite induction, as Kleene called it, meaning that the relevant applications of Theorem 11 are checked one-by-one, by separate applications of the Second Recursion Theorem. This is the method used for many, basic results in Chapter 7 of Moschovakis (2009a) and in much of Kleene's (and many others') work on constructive ordinals and hyperarithmetical sets, cf. Moschovakis (2010) .
Is
T r a refinement of effective descriptive set theory? This was the claim in the introduction, that the classical theory, properly understood, "yields the uniformities which refine the statements of the classical results, and it also provides constructive proofs that they do". Well, a proof in T r is exactly as constructive as the proofs of the recursive C-realizability of the axioms it uses, and these axioms fall (roughly) in three categories.
First, there are statements like (18) which are blatantly non-constructive on their face, but whose recursive C-realizability is a direct (and evidently constructive) consequence of our choice of codings. I think that these are innocuous; and the choice of codings which make these basic propositions obvious is at the heart of the applicability of the method.
At the other extreme are statements like those in Lemmas 3, 4 and Proposition 6, where the proofs of C-realizability are blatantly classical. For example, the claim that (A c ) c = A in the proof of Lemma 4 is (ultimately) justified because rcr (∀x ∈ A)(∀y ∈ B)[x ∈ y ↔ ¬¬(x ∈ y)].
This is a (classically) trivial consequence of our identifying C-realizability with satisfiability for prime formulas, and there is no getting around it without changing the method radically. Somewhere between these two extremes are statements like Theorem 11, the basic Principle of Proof by Wellfounded Induction, where reasonable people may reasonably differ on whether the proof of its C-realizability is constructive. (And they are likely to fall in several camps, according to the specific wellfounded relation ≺ .)
Taken with all its axioms no matter how they are established, T r is obviously not a constructive theory. It has, however, the "constructive feature" that it can only prove effectively true ∀-∃ sentences-but I don't have a good name for this property of a theory.
What were they thinking? Borel and Lebesgue and Lusin and the others. They thought of themselves as constructivists-and in some cases they say that, explicitly; they rejected (also explicitly) some blatant applications of the Axiom of Choice-like the existence of a function which assigns to each countable ordinal ξ a wellordering in N with order type ξ; but they accepted the Countable Axiom of Choice, the De Morgan rules for countable unions, and (I believe, though I do not have a reference) the stability of membership (20). Moreover, from reading them, one gets the feeling that their conception of sets and what one does with them was robust, not the object of introspection or doubt. (Lusin, for example, had apparently expressed the belief that co-analytic sets cannot be "constructively" uniformized, but he accepted Novikoff's proof of it even though it is by no means elementary. The Novikoff-Kondo proof of Π 1 1 uniformization can be given in T r , of course, and so it yields its effective version about Π 1 1 .) I find the problem of understanding better the universe of classical descriptive set theory and the logic of its practitioners fascinating, both historically and (especially) mathematically, and it is my hope that the considerations of this article may be relevant to it. sympathetic to any "foundational views" that are expressed in it, explicitly or implicitly.
